[Vol. 2 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 10 (CTEA) included a new justification for the expansion of copyright: benefit to the work itself.
A public domain work is an orphan. No question about that. No one is responsible for its future life. But everyone exploits its use until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard and barren of all its former virtues. Who then ---who then will invest the funds required to renovate it and to nourish its future when nobody owns it? 11 Jack Valenti made this argument with respect to older motion pictures. Without the incentive of copyright protection, the theory goes, no one will undertake the expensive task of preserving and distributing celluloid films, resulting in their loss to society. Either Congress bought one of the many policy rationales offered for the CTEA ---the legislation was also justified as harmonizing American and international copyright protection and as providing benefits for American copyright owners in connection with use of their works abroad 12 ---or the politics favoring passage were just too strong, 13 because Congress passed the CTEA's twenty-year extension and applied that extension to the previously existing works about which Mr. Valenti had testified, again changing American copyright law.
But not all changes to copyright take place in Congress. Just as lobbyists have gone to Congress seeking to change the reach of copyright protection, litigants have gone to the courts, also hoping to alter the face of American copyright law. One of the most significant judicial changes to copyright happened in 1991, when the Supreme Court decided in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. that facts are outside the scope of copyright. 14. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Feist Publications was an independent publisher of ''area-wide'' telephone directories, directories covering more than one telephone service area. Rural was a local telephone company that published its own directory for the service area it covered. To publish its directory, Feist copied names, telephone numbers, and some address information out of Rural's directory. Because Feist admitted to copying the information from Rural's directory, the only question was whether the subscriber information was copyrightable. 15 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act limits copyright protection to ''original works of authorship, '' 16 meaning that the names and telephone numbers in Rural's directory could not be copyrightable unless they were ''original.'' In the years leading up to the decision in Feist, the circuits had split over whether ''originality,'' in copyright parlance, permitted protection against the copying of facts based merely on the labor expended by the author in collecting those facts. Feist rejected this view, commonly referred to as the ''sweat of the brow'' doctrine, and instead insisted that originality required not only that the work originate with the author, but also that the work be the product of the author's creativity. Rural may have discovered the facts contained in its directory, but Rural did not create them, and they were therefore not copyrightable. 17 After Feist, it became clear that the standard for copyrightability was not merely originality, but creative originality.
The case could have been an unremarkable resolution of a circuit split but for the Court's decision to ground its holding not only in the copyright statute, but also in the Constitution. ''Originality,'' the Court explained, ''is a constitutional requirement. '' 18 Originality is inherent in the Copyright Clause's use of the term ''writings'' (a widely accepted rule since the 1879 Trade-Mark Cases), and because facts cannot be original (by the analysis above), copyright protection for facts is unconstitutional. 19 It was not enough to say that Congress did not extend protection to facts; Congress could not extend protection to facts. 20 The Court elaborated, explaining how denying protection to facts was also necessary to fulfill the ''primary objective'' of the Copyright 15. Id Denying protection to facts leaves them available for future authors to use in creating their own works, which furthers progress. ''This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art. '' 22 The Court's conclusion that promoting progress requires that facts be unprotected by copyright is a sweeping policy statement, one on which many reasonable minds differ. 23 In 1991, the Supreme Court, whether it recognized it or not, made profound copyright policy. They better have gotten it right, because Feist is a matter of constitutional law now ---a Supreme Court decision that can be undone only by another Supreme Court decision or by constitutional amendment. Feist's requirement of creative originality is a part of American copyright law that Congress cannot change.
Perhaps encouraged by the Supreme Court's willingness in Feist to engage in constitutional policymaking, several plaintiffs, including Eric Eldred, filed suit seeking to strike down the CTEA's extension of the copyright term for works already in existence, both as an improper exercise of the copyright power and as a violation of the First Amendment. 24 The heart of their Copyright Clause challenge was that extensions to subsisting works do not promote progress, a requirement embodied in the Progress Phrase. The Eldred petitioners disputed the supposed benefits of the CTEA, asserting that the act would not actually harmonize American copyright law with international copyright protection. 26 As for Jack Valenti's proffered justification for extending the copyright terms of existing works ---the incentive to preserve older works ---the Eldred petitioners countered that copyright term extension for existing works actually discourages preservation efforts:
Much of this film is ''orphaned'' because current copyright holders cannot be identified, and all of it is now decaying because of the unstable properties of nitrate-based film and even so-called ''safety'' film. [One of the petitioners] restores these old films when they pass into the public domain, but under the CTEA no films will pass into the public domain for 20 years. 27 Similarly, other Eldred petitioners have built an archive of public domain movies which will make film available in a digital form to viewers and filmmakers around the world. The technical capacity of this archive is limited only by the number of machines linked to the network . . . . The copyright [ hereinafter Eldred Petitioners' Brief]. Regardless of the textual basis, the heart of this claim is that the CTEA's term extensions for existing works do not promote progress and should therefore be invalidated. The Court took this claim to mean that the CTEA should be struck because it does not promote progress, Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 784, and I will discuss it as such.
Their third Copyright Clause claim was that the CTEA, by failing to extract anything in return for its added protection, violates the Copyright Clause's requirement that all grants be in the form of a quid pro quo, a claim the Court handled by ''demur[ring]'' to the petitioners' claim that the Clause might require an exchange, but finding any requirement of an exchange satisfied, id. at 786, and distinguishing the Court's stronger exchange-oriented statements in the patent context, id. at 786-87. Finally, the petitioners argued that an extension of copyright in an existing work violates the Copyright Clause's requirement of originality as announced in Feist. The Court responded without even addressing the logic of the argument, merely pointing out instead that the case the petitioners cited for the originality requirement, Feist, had nothing to do with duration. Id. at 784. In addition to their enumerated claims, the Court treated the case as addressing whether the CTEA is ''a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause,'' which the Court found was satisfied by the same justifications as Progress Phrase challenge: ''international concerns'' and by responding to changing markets by providing an incentive to restore and release old films. Id. at 782, 785. The Progress Phrase claim was the petitioners' strongest, id. at 784, and I believe it is this claim that raises the most interesting questions about how the Court should review copyright laws for compliance with the Copyright Clause. While I do not wish to diminish the importance of the petitioners' First Amendment claims, my inquiry is limited to the Copyright Clause.
26. Eldred Petitioners' Brief, supra note 25, at 43-44. 27. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 2 owners of many of these films cannot be identified. Their work thus cannot be made available on the Internet.
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When a film becomes an ''orphan,'' it seems, is a matter of dispute.
The Court rejected the Progress Phrase challenge by holding that, as demonstrated by historical practice, the extension of copyright in an existing work does not run afoul of the Progress Phrase 29 and that, given Congress's stated international and preservation-oriented justifications for the act, there was a ''rational basis'' for believing that the CTEA promotes progress.
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But the Court consciously refused to question whether extending the term of copyright in order to respond to international increases in copyright terms and to provide an incentive to preserve and distribute older works served ''progress'' as defined by the Clause. 31 The Court was willing to engage in rational basis scrutiny to determine whether the means served the stated end, but it would not second-guess Congress's determination of an appropriate end. The Court found the CTEA to be a rational means of furthering progress but let pass Congress's chosen definition of ''progress'' without specifying the level of review it had applied. The Court's heavy emphasis in Eldred on the historical practice of extending the copyright term for existing works makes the case of uncertain value as a precedent for challenges to more novel forms of regulation, whether promulgated under the Copyright Clause or under other Article I grants of authority.
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I would like to offer a more 28 . Id Agreements Act, § 514, 17 U.S.C. § 104A. Section 104A ''restores'' copyright to works by foreign authors if the work fell into the public domain in the United States because (i) the author failed to comply with a formality imposed by the Copyright Act, (ii) the work was a sound recording fixed before federal copyright was extended to sound recordings in 1972, or (iii) the author lacked national eligibility. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A), (h)(6). Such a grant is arguably inconsistent with language in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), a patent case in which the Supreme Court wrote in dicta that ''Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available,'' and there is no similarly pervasive historical practice of granting rights in works that have fallen into public domain.
But see Eldred, 123 Challenges to copyright legislation based on the Progress Phrase are cases about ambiguity ---not just ambiguity in the text itself, but ambiguity over what purpose the text serves in the constitutional order. Those arguing for the use of the Progress Phrase to restrict Congress's power can point to a body of case law suggesting that the Court will aggressively review federal laws for compliance with the Constitution's restrictions on congressional authority, but those who have argued for restrictive judicial review of the copyright power have ignored the basis for the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to interpreting congressional power. When one considers the rationales behind the various justifications for judicial review ---including the Rehnquist Court's rediscovery of constitutional limits on Article I powers ---it becomes clear that arguments for reading the Copyright Clause restrictively ignore the foundational premises of constitutional judicial review. Rather, calls for reading the Copyright Clause restrictively are merely attempts to employ the rhetoric of constitutional limitation to engage the Court in making socially optimal copyright policy. That the Court should not do so is plain not only as a matter of republican values, but also as a matter of relative competence to make copyright policy. Far from safeguarding constitutional values, challenges based on the Progress Phrase will place modern copyright law at the mercy of a group ill qualified to make modern copyright policy: the Framers.
II. WHAT COPYRIGHT CLAUSE CHALLENGES ARE NOT
A. An Aside on Ambiguity
Recognizing that Eldred is a case about constitutional ambiguity is hardly an insight, but it is important to note that the ambiguity at issue in Eldred is not primarily a textual one. 4,564) aff'd 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815) (upholding a private bill extending the duration of a previously expired patent). Sooner or later, the Court will have to decide whether Congress has a completely free hand when it comes to determining whether a particular copyrightrelated goal promotes progress.
On the possibility that Congress could turn to another power, see Thomas B. That is not to say that the Copyright Clause is necessarily clear. For example, the phrase ''limited Times'' is clear in some ways and ambiguous in others. If one is asking whether copyright grants may be perpetual, ''limited Times'' is clear ---they may not. However, if the question is whether the duration of a copyright can be extended after the grant is made, ''limited Times'' provides a less certain answer.
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Application of the Progress Phrase almost always raises a nice question of textual ambiguity: What is ''progress''? That is a question with as many answers as there are opinions, 35 but I do not believe that it is the important ambiguity at issue in cases challenging copyright laws for failure to promote progress. Indeed, my only point about the word ''progress'' (discussed more fully below) is that its inherent ambiguity cannot possibly be a reason for reading the Copyright Clause restrictively. The one point on which the Copyright Clause seems to be free of ambiguity is the question at the center of the disagreement in Eldred. There can be no general debate over whether the Clause means that any system of exclusive rights established pursuant to the Clause must promote progress; 36 the Clause clearly says that its objective is to promote progress. It hardly takes sophisticated textual analysis to determine that the promotion of progress is part of what the Clause is about. 37 Rather, the more fundamental ambiguity underlying Eldred stems from the constitutional implications of a charge that Congress has failed to abide by the restriction that its grants of exclusive rights promote progress. 38 In this regard, cases challenging copyright legislation on the basis of non-compliance with the Progress Phrase are very similar to the cases challenging Congress [Vol. 2 policy. For unelected judges to discard the product of representative lawmaking and replace it with their own judgment about what the law should be is at least superficially undemocratic. The concern is captured nicely by the label applied to the problem in 1962 by Alexander Bickel: the counter-majoritarian difficulty. 44 In the face of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the case for active judicial review has been made most commonly in a few broad (and frequently overlapping) areas. The first three track roughly the three categories described by the Supreme Court in footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products, Inc.:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. The Rehnquist Court's emphasis on maintaining the constitutional balance of power in the American system accounts for a fourth area of heightened judicial scrutiny.
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I would like to suggest that, collectively, the justifications for heightened judicial review break down into four categories of cases, those involving: 1) fundamental rights and principles, 2) attempts by the government to prevent the electorate from exercising political rights, 3) systematic discrimination (most clearly implicated by discrimination by the majority against the minority), and 4) attempts to alter the boundaries and relative power of the various competitors for governmental power in the constitutional system.
One should not take my categories of arguments for judicial review as an attempt to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of theories of judicial review, nor do I mean to endorse the categories I've laid out as equally deserving of rigorous judicial review ---my enterprise is descriptive, not normative. Similarly, my list fails to acknowledge theories advocating restrictive approaches to judicial review 47 and the contributions by commentators to elaborate on these categories (which I will address in modest detail below). Rather, my goal is merely to list the categories of cases that are generally regarded as deserving heightened judicial review. Despite the amount of attention constitutional judicial review has received from courts and commentators over the last several decades, the widely accepted theories supporting expansive judicial review fit roughly within these four categories, albeit with wide variations within them.
And if my groupings are not wholly mistaken, one thing is clear from even cursory consideration: review of legislation for compliance with the Copyright Clause falls within none of them.
C. Copyright and Fundamental Interests
The first category has perhaps received the most attention from commentators inquiring into the proper reach of judicial review. argued that the category is more appropriately viewed as including cases involving basic or fundamental liberties. Alexander Bickel's own response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, for instance, was not so much to justify judicial review as to limit its reach, in part by limiting its application to matters of principle and defining ''principle'' narrowly. Judicial review, he wrote, extends over a broad range of public issues in our system . . . Ranging as widely as it has and as, on the premises I accept, there is no reason it should not, judicial review brings principle to bear on the operations of government.
By ''principle'' is meant general propositions . . . ; organizing ideas of universal validity in the given universe of a culture and a place, ideas that are often grounded in ethical and moral presuppositions. 48 Others have elaborated on the moral and fundamental basis for intervention in some circumstances. My co-panelist, Christopher Eisgruber argues that the major advantage judges have over the legislature or electorate is their ability to remain impartial ---the quality of responding to ''the interests and opinions of all the people, rather than merely serving the majority or some other faction'' 49 ---when considering important matters of morality. According to Professor Eisgruber, matters of constitutional morality are likely to be implicated when the scope of individual civil rights (such as the right to the free exercise of religion or equal protection of the laws) 50 and fundamental liberties (as embodied in the doctrine of substantive due process) are in question.
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Bruce Ackerman has also argued for an expansive approach to the first category, contending that judges should apply heightened review in order to protect, as a matter of ''higher law,'' ''basic rights'' that he claims go beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
On ''impartiality'' as he uses it, see id. Rights''). Ronald Dworkin's ''moral reading'' of the Constitution implicates similarly fundamental principles, although citation to Dworkin itself demonstrates the overlap of the But neither a more restrictive approach focusing on enumerated constitutional rights nor a broader view of implied fundamental interests supports application of a heightened standard when reviewing legislation for consistency with the Copyright Clause. Copyright law certainly has the potential to affect interests that might be characterized as fundamental. But that is not to say that the application of anything as grand as fundamental principles can resolve any of the ambiguities present in the Copyright Clause.
Nor is consideration of the fundamental interests affected by the Copyright Clause helpful in uncovering its meaning.
Some commentators have argued that a permissive reading of the Copyright Clause is inconsistent with the Framers' general disdain for monopolies. 53 Even if that were true, it's hard to place ''the right to be free from monopolies'' among the kinds of fundamental interests typically protected by courts through a heightened standard of judicial review. The right to be free from monopolies is a right with purely economic consequences, and not since the Lochner Era have economic rights as economic rights received any heightened form of constitutional judicial protection. While regulation of some activities that are primarily economic ---such as commercial speech ---is subject to heightened scrutiny, that is so not because of the economic impact of the regulation but rather because of the direct effect of the regulation on some more fundamental interest. [Vol. 2 overturning Lochner that the right to engage in any particular economic activity is not so fundamental as to warrant heightened scrutiny.
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The most likely candidate for a fundamental interest affected by copyright is the interest in free speech. Although copyright can affect speech interests by increasing the cost of speech ---at least speech that would amount to infringement of a copyright 56 ---it is difficult to come up with either a fundamental principle that necessarily determines the point at which the increased cost of speech is intolerable or a fundamental liberty to speak without paying the person whose speech one is copying. 57 Indeed, the wide acceptance of copyright by the framing generation itself suggests that the two interests are far from inconsistent.
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Even if one assumes that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment represents a fundamental principle in tension with copyright, 59 it is hard to glean any sort of specific limit on copyright based on First Amendment protections. 60 How long a duration, exactly, The analysis that applies to the Copyright Act is suggestive of the relationship between the First Amendment and the Intellectual Property Clause. The constraints on laws imposed by the Intellectual Property Clause ---the originality requirement, the exclusion of materials already in the public domain, and the express time limitation ---are inherent constraints on the tension between property rights in information enacted within the confines of that clause, and the values of free speech.'') (footnote omitted) Id.; L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1987) (describing the ''three free speech constraints implicit in copyright ---publication, no copyright is the maximum permissible in order to serve the speech interests represented by the First Amendment? Is the granting of exclusive rights to facts or ideas inconsistent with the First Amendment? If so, how can trade secret law be constitutional? 61 This is not to say that legislation passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause should be immune from First Amendment scrutiny. Rather, my point is that there are no ''organizing ideas of universal validity . . . grounded in ethical and moral presuppositions'' 62 underlying any particular definition of the copyright power described in the Copyright Clause. A copyright statute may fail First Amendment scrutiny, but that only means that, as a matter of constitutional law, Congress's copyright power is limited by the First Amendment's requirement that Congress not overly burden speech. It is another thing to say that the scope of the Copyright Clause itself can only be determined after one considers the relevant fundamental principles embodied in the First Amendment (if any there are).
Why does it matter? After all, a copyright law that violates an enforceable free speech principle will be struck regardless of whether the violation is identified as a violation of the First Amendment or as being beyond the copyright power. But the distinction is critical because, while free speech principles might be fundamental, First Amendment doctrine has never been absolute. 63 As the Court has expanded cognizable free speech interests, it has developed a number of devices to prevent them from overwhelming all others. Thus, in cases involving content-neutral legislation, the Court has adopted a rough balancing test to assure that the government interest being furthered is substantial and that speech rights are not being curtailed more than necessary to further that government interest. If the First Amendment were understood to create a presumptive right to publish anything that might be deemed 'true,' legal recourse for a vast array of injuries effectuated through the revelation of truthful material would be eviscerated, from the revelation of trade secrets to disclosure of information that one is contractually bound to keep confidential. But even if the First Amendment does contain such principles, that is only the beginning of the analysis as a matter of First Amendment doctrine. Free speech principles often give way when they are outweighed by competing legislative interests, but arguments that the reach of the copyright power is limited by principles contained in the First Amendment would prohibit all such regulation, without regard to its net regulatory effect. Thus, proponents of particular views of the First Amendment could obtain through the Copyright Clause that which they could not obtain through the application of the First Amendment itself: an absolute prohibition against copyright laws inconsistent with free speech values. 66 The availability of such arguments is not hypothetical ---arguments supporting the Copyright Clause's denial of protection to facts based on the need to have access to facts for the purposes of debate raise precisely this problem.
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Of course, the very availability of First Amendment review of copyright legislation 68 severely undercuts any call for vigorous judicial review of copyright laws on the basis of speech protections genetic to the Copyright Clause. Even if Congress is given carte blanche to exercise its copyright power based on its own interpretation of the Copyright Clause, legislation overly harmful to speech interests will be invalidated by the Court under the First Amendment itself. There simply is nothing 65 to be gained by reading into the Copyright Clause potentially fundamental principles already protected by the First Amendment.
Although copyright allocates an important social resource, its effects on speech are much less direct than those resulting from many other economic regulations, such as the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Act or the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. But, while the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act must pass First Amendment review, 69 to argue that the First Amendment has anything to say about how one interprets the reach of the Commerce Clause inverts the analysis. The First Amendment can limit the commerce (or copyright) power, but that is quite a different argument from suggesting that it supplies definition to the text of Article I.
D. Majorities, Minorities, and the Politics of Copyright
The second and third classes of justifications offered for aggressive judicial review ---overreaching that prevents the electorate from exercising political rights and systematic discrimination by the majority against the minority ---have also received considerable attention from commentators.
In his book Democracy and Distrust, for instance, John Hart Ely offered a proceduralist theory of judicial review, which he termed ''representation reinforcement,'' and justified judicial intervention based on the presence of a ''malfunction'' in representative government.
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
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These two breakdowns in the political system are often closely related; one of the most effective ways in which a majority can insulate its discrimination against the minority is to deny the minority access to the avenues of political change. [Vol. 2 I will treat these two categories together, both because of their close relationship and because, when the conversation is limited to copyright, talk of systematic discrimination makes very little sense, 72 or at least does very little to further the argument that the Copyright Clause deserves to be read restrictively. 73 Rather, if one were to describe the relevant ''majority'' and ''minority'' for copyright, the holders of economically valuable copyrights play the role of the minority at risk of legislative discrimination by those of us who would gain from relaxing copyright protection.
That the very few owners of valuable copyrights are not a helpless minority is explained by public choice theory ---a theory about how the majority's political rights might be nullified, if not suppressed. Public choice theory posits that small groups of individuals who place great value in a set of shared interests (interest groups) will consistently be able to control the legislative agenda in the face of a larger, but diffuse, majority. Such interest groups can effectively commandeer representative government on the relevant issue and through it shift wealth (in the form of legal rights, tax breaks, or whatever) from the majority to their members based not on the merits of such a legislative choice but merely as a result of the group's coordinated political influence.
74 This is, in a property rights to the same class of property based on the race of the owner) will be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as will a similarly flawed law having nothing to do with property (such as a regulation setting different speed limits for the same stretch of road based on the race of the driver).
74. My summary of public choice theory does justice to neither the theory's subtleties nor its many forms. slightly more developed form, Madison's concern about the destructive potential of ''faction. '' 75 Many who have called for active judicial review of Congress's exercise of the copyright power have pointed to the problem of public choice as demonstrating a breakdown in the political process that only the Court can correct. The argument goes something like this: Owners of valuable copyrights compose a powerful interest group, while the public (and future generations), which will bear the cost of enhanced copyright protection, are a diffuse group. The disparity of incentives between these two groups is reflected in their relative ability to influence Congress's copyright legislation, which systematically leads to increases in the scope and duration of copyright. This systematic push toward enlarging copyright is the realization of a public choice problem that demonstrates a breakdown of the political process. Breakdowns of the political process are precisely the kinds of problems for which a proceduralist theory of judicial review (such as Ely's) would justify judicial intervention. Therefore, judges should read the Copyright Clause restrictively in order to correct for the public choice problem inherent in Congress's exercise of the copyright power. To Madison, ''faction'' is ''a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of others citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.'' Ironically, Madison himself addressed this question, arguing that the owners of intellectual property rights were more likely to be victims than winners in the political process:
Is there not also infinitely less danger of [the] abuse [of monopolies] in our Governments than in most others? Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (1958).
76. See, e.g., Eldred Petitioners' Brief at 27-28; Benkler, supra note 56, at 571 (''What is important to understand for contemporary purposes of institutional design is that insofar as the progress of knowledge is concerned, the basic assumption is that the politics of faction will lead to too much recognition of exclusive rights at the expense of the common good.''); The process, however, seems to have failed with the [CTEA], because massive extensions of future copyrights were enacted ---with no real support for such encroachments upon the public domain and the public interest ---just to gain retrospective protection of existing copyright terms. John Hart Ely has discussed an analogous problem in the larger area of judicial review generally.
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The argument proves too much. Copyright does not present any special form of public choice problem; it is the same public choice problem that exists whenever a well-coordinated minority has much to gain from the enactment of a slight burden on a diffuse majority. If the presence of legislative capture or the existence of rent-seeking were an adequate basis for heightened judicial scrutiny, every exercise of congressional power that could favor a well-organized minority over the majority demands vigorous scrutiny.
77 ''The rent-seeking model, if taken seriously, would require much broader judicial review than even the Lochner Court ever contemplated. '' 78 Some have argued that copyright presents an unusually severe public choice problem because the burden imposed by copyright expansion is not apparent to average voters; copyright expansion has the effect of a government subsidy, but its implementation is in the form of a hidden tax. 79 That hardly distinguishes copyright from other opportunities for , and these distortions will always skew copyright legislation towards everincreasing protection, with only occasional exemptions where specific harms are directly borne by cohesive interest groups such as broadcasters, cable operators, or software producers.'') (arguing for heightened judicial review under the First Amendment).
77. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 74, at 68 (listing ''tariffs, defense contracts, public works projects, direct subsidies, government loans, and a host of other activities''). See also Ackerman, supra note 52, at 739-40 (When considering whether to apply heightened scrutiny, the ability of the harmed class to represent itself in the political process should be of little import. Rather, what matters is whether there is discrimination against the group in a way inimical to the fundamental values of the Constitution.). Although public choice theory is concerned with transparency, that concern is primarily with the transparency of the legislative process, not the transparency of the effects of the legislation, which have little to do with the validity of the reasons for the legislation's legislative rent-seeking. The same opacity is present in the case of tariffs, which also serve as subsidies that are paid by consumers in the form of higher prices for (often downstream) goods. 80 But only the most radical devotee of public choice theory would argue that Congress's exercise of the power to set tariffs, to use Madison's example, 81 should be policed by courts to ensure that Congress has not fallen prey to special interests. 82 The Framers were concerned about the possibility of legislative capture by economic interests, to be sure, but their solution was not aggressive judicial review. Instead, the Constitution's solution is to gather a large group of geographically dispersed individuals with divergent interests under a republican government. 83 Arguments that we should rely on judicial review as the solution to copyright-owner rentseeking are arguments that we should respond to a problem with representative government by discarding it; it is a solution to a problem identified by the Framers that ignores the very system they put in place.
Certainly intellectual property regulation presents opportunities for small, well-organized groups to seek and obtain rents from society; such groups have done so consistently. The same can be said of dozens of areas of federal regulation, yet we don't hear calls for constitutional limitations on Congress's ability to levy tariffs or provide senior citizens with prescription drug benefits. Other than an awkwardly worded clause in the Constitution to provide a textual hook, what makes copyright so special? More relevantly, how can such widely applicable concerns about the legislative process justify judicial intervention in applying the ambiguous text of the Copyright Clause? The presence of rent-seeking in copyright cannot be enough to warrant denying Congress the power to make copyright policy.
passage. Thus, public choice theory commonly concerns itself with the problem of legislators avoiding responsibility for legislation by delegating policymaking responsibility to others. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 74, at 136-39. See also ELY, supra note 70, at (arguing that judicial review is appropriate to correct for attempts by the legislature to reduce its accountability to the electorate by delegating policymaking authority to administrative agencies). Again, that problem is no more likely to arise in the context of copyright than it is to arise in any other area of economic regulation. 
E. Copyright and the Balance of Power
Nor do arguments that the Court take an active role in policing the copyright power fall into the final category of justifications for aggressive judicial review: maintenance of the relative power of the various competitors for power in the constitutional system. The need for judicial review in such cases is obvious: The constitutional scheme relies heavily for its stability on dividing power among various governmental entities, and the entities cannot themselves be trusted to decide the boundaries of their own power. 84 For every increase in the ability of one to control another, there is a corresponding loss by the one being controlled. The Court, with its limited ability to make or implement policy and its consequently greater degree of impartiality, is the best judge of the proper boundaries between the Constitution's various governmental entities.
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That maintaining the balance of power among governmental entities can be a basis for vigilant judicial review will hardly come as news to Court-watchers. Although the Court has consistently enforced the separation of powers among the branches of the federal government, 86 it has been particularly aggressive of late in its review of laws that potentially alter the relationship between the federal and state governments. Concern over maintaining the federal-state balance of power is perhaps most apparent in the Court's resurgent Tenth and 99 (1995) (arguing that not only are individual members of Congress more dependent for reelection on national parties than they are on state interests, but also that they have an interest in increasing federal control in order to increase the size of the ''pool of resources or 'pork''' out of which they can distribute political favors to their supporters). 93 ''Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of the congressional authority. This concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power. '' 94 In an effort to call upon the Court's attitude of intervention in such cases, many, including the plaintiffs in Eldred, have argued that the Court should apply a similar level of review to congressional attempts to broaden copyright power. I would like to suggest one. While vigilant judicial review in the federalism context is a response to the possibility that Congress has taken power from the States, thereby altering the balance of power so carefully established by the Constitution, the exercise of the copyright power presents no similarly fundamental danger to the constitutional order because exercise of the copyright power does not in any way impinge on the authority of the States. Of course, exercise of the copyright power could impinge on the authority of the States, but only by altering the rights of the States to regulate.
EISGRUBER
99 If the Copyright Act presents a problem worthy of judicial review under the federalism cases, it is Section 301 of the Copyright Act, which expressly takes power from the States by preempting state copyright laws. [A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by [Vol. 2 alterations to the scope or duration of copyright do not shift power from some other entity (state or federal) to Congress ---they merely alter the legal rights of private parties, which is not the sort of constitutional selfdealing that requires vigilance by the Court under any theory of judicial review concerned with the balance of governmental powers. Instead, copyright legislation presents only the potential for ---constitutionally speaking ---the milder form of congressional self-dealing described by public choice theory. And, as demonstrated above, the potential for rent-seeking by private special interest groups is far too broad a justification to support heightened judicial review in the copyright context. Simply put, copyright does not go to the essence of the constitutional framework in the same way that federalism does, and the Court's decision in Eldred reflects the distinction. So long as Congress sticks to altering the legal rights of private parties instead of governmental entities, the Court has little interest in second-guessing its decision to do so, and rightly so. The Court struck the Violence Against Women Act not because it altered the legal rights of Christy Brzonkala and Antonio Morrison in an unconstitutional way but rather because it altered the regulatory rights of the federal and state governments in an unconstitutional way. 101 No similar alteration of governmental powers is presented by any substantive change to the copyright laws.
Although the Rehnquist Court has been willing to enforce limits on the reach of Congress's Article I powers, the theory underlying that willingness does not extend to review of copyright legislation. Congress's self-interest in altering the federal-state balance of power in its favor, along with the singular importance of maintaining that balance in the larger constitutional scheme, calls for close review of any legislation that expands Congress's regulatory universe. But copyright presents neither the same potential for congressional avarice nor the same degree of harm in the event of congressional overreaching. Assuming that Section 301 is constitutional, there simply is no inter-governmental balance of power to be maintained in matters of copyright. Aggressive judicial review of this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (''We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.'').
copyright legislation cannot be justified by reference to the Court's federalism jurisprudence.
F. Copyright and the Policy of Progress
The only constitutional issue raised by the CTEA and most expansions of copyright is quite narrow and specific to the Copyright Clause itself: Is there a need for the Court to review copyright legislation to determine whether it actually promotes progress? Eldred (at least as limited to the Copyright Clause) did not require resolution according to fundamental interests, the correction of some profound corruption of the democratic process beyond the normal concerns of public choice, or the protection of the Constitution's very existence through preservation of the distinction between the federal and state governments.
102 Stripped of pretense, Eldred and cases like it are simply appeals to the Court to intervene by second-guessing Congress's conclusion that a particular piece of copyright legislation promotes progress. In the balance of the paper, I will endeavor to explain why such invitations are properly declined.
III. THE COURT AS COPYRIGHT POLICYMAKER
The starting place for any discussion of whether the Court should intervene in the decisions of Congress must be the premise that the Court should only intervene when there is a clear justification for doing so. That is the premise underlying the counter-majoritarian difficulty; it is a normative preference for democratic self-government and is articulated in the Constitution's conscious choice of the republican form of government. When the Constitution's text is not clear, the Constitution's preference for representative government requires the Court to defer to Congress in the absence of some larger justification for intervention, be it moral or constitutional. The arguments for judicial intervention discussed in the previous section represent such justifications. The question is whether there is an equally powerful justification for an interventionist approach to the Copyright Clause.
Our preference for republican lawmaking may itself be a strong enough argument to rebut assertions that the Court is the right political entity to make copyright policy. But I would like, for the moment, to 102 . See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 376 (distinguishing the lack of Supreme Court interest in enforcing ''internal'' limits on Article I powers from its willingness to review legislation for violations of ''external'' limits, such as ''separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights concerns'').
[Vol. 2 ignore the intrinsic value of democratically made policy and focus simply on the Court's capacity to make good copyright policy with the tools the Constitution has given it. Even if we forget the Constitution's preference for republican government, the Court's institutional weaknesses caution against giving it any meaningful role in regulating copyright ---a concern reflected by the many bromides the Court has offered us about its relative ability to make economic policy. 103 When we remind ourselves of the Court's place in the constitutional framework, the case for aggressive judicial review of the copyright power dissolves completely.
The best way to demonstrate the point is through examination of the Court's most audacious attempt at constitutional copyright policymaking in the last 130 years: Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
A. Feist and the Policy of Denying Protection to Facts
The policy announced by the Progress Phrase is the promotion of progress, but whether a particular protection will actually promote progress is often not only unknown, it's unknowable. A prime example is copyright's awarding of less protection to non-fiction works than to fictional ones. The degree of protection afforded by copyright decreases as the work becomes more factual, 104 to the point that facts are not protected at all, which is the rule of Feist. Feist maintains that denying protection to facts is not just textually required by the word ''writings,'' it's good copyright policy. Copyright's denial of protection to facts ''is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.''
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The theory supporting that policy choice is that the extra incentive gained from providing protection would be outweighed by the lost ability to freely copy the facts, with a net loss to progress. 106 Is that correct? It's impossible to say.
We don't know what would happen if Congress extended copyright protection to facts. Perhaps there would be a flood of inexpensive factbased works if their creators could easily recapture the cost of creating 103. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997) (noting that the Court is ''institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them'').
104 works promote the progress of science; unoriginal material does not promote the progress of science, and is therefore constitutionally incapable of protection.''). them, with consumers benefiting from that broader availability even if they themselves do not purchase the works (for instance, they could benefit from lower prices because suppliers of goods are able to reduce their costs by buying and using certain fact-based works). New protection might enable new modes of distribution for such works that entail lower transaction costs. 107 Currently, authors of unprotectable fact works can prevent free distribution of their works only through such selfhelp measures as encryption technology or tightly enforced licensing arrangements, both of which can be unwieldy and expensive. Many have offered theoretical models to support or attack protection of facts, 108 but no one can prove what the net effect to progress would be of granting copyright-like protection to facts.
Indeed, the only thing that is certain is uncertainty; some forms of fact protection would likely promote progress, while others would surely hinder it. 109 Trade secret law, for instance, is an example of a narrow form of protection for facts that many believe encourages innovation.
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One can easily imagine weaker forms of copyright in facts that would have a net positive effect on progress.
But Congress cannot extend any form of copyright protection to facts, nor can the Court allow it to, because of the decision in Feist. The durability of constitutional adjudication makes it particularly ill suited to deciding what promotes progress given the rapidly changing economics of intellectual property. Even if Feist was correctly decided as a matter of constitutional law, it was breathtakingly short-sighted as a matter of policy. Twelve years ago, our ability to share information was still limited to paper, 1200 baud modems, and floppy disks. Regardless of whether one agrees with extending protection to facts, it is undeniable that no one (and certainly not the Court) understood the economic ramifications of the Feist decision in 1991. [Vol. 2 makes it particularly dangerous to etch any particular vision of ''progress, '' or what it takes to promote it, into constitutional stone.
The longevity of constitutional rules is not the worst problem presented by constitutional judicial review of copyright legislation. Indeed, one could argue that it is no easier to get Congress to change its mind than it is to get the Court to, a problem that's exacerbated in the case of an established entitlement. It would probably be no harder to get Feist reversed than it would be to get Congress to repeal the CTEA.
What makes the Court's approach in Feist so troublesome is that, contained in what little the Framers did say about copyright. 114 Even if we could be confident in the Court's ability to deduce what the Framers thought copyright should be, it's not at all clear that we should want them to. And therein lies a second problem of relative competence ---not the relative competence of the Court and Congress but the relative competence of the Framers and Congress. Unlike the Framers, Congress evolves as an institution and it continues to accumulate knowledge about markets for intellectual property, both as an abstract matter and because those markets change over time. Newton turned out to have an incomplete understanding of physics; why do we think that Madison had a more complete understanding of intellectual property?
We know almost nothing about the process of authorship or of authors' responsiveness to the incentives offered them by the copyright system; it is virtually certain that the Framers knew even less. It does not appear to have been a topic of much importance to them. The Records of the Federal Convention show no debate over the Patent and Copyright Clause, nor does there appear to have been more than the slightest mention of copyright at any of the state ratifying conventions.
115 What little discussion there was at the state conventions indicates that the primary import of the Patent and Copyright Clause was not to assure any particular substantive limitation on Congress's ability to grant copyrights but rather to solve the problem of non-uniform state intellectual property laws. 118 At the heart of claims that the CTEA is unconstitutional, for example, is the conviction that Congress should not be allowed to tie us to a 1980s'model of film distribution and preservation because doing so violates an eighteenth-century model of intellectual property. But eighteenth-century copyright policy doesn't necessarily represent fundamentally correct copyright law; it was just the policy deemed most appropriate for the time, as a matter of both economics and political morality.
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Were the Framers so much better at copyright that we should be anxious to restrain our political freedom by looking to them instead of today's Congress to make twenty-first-century copyright policy? 120 We may not be happy with the CTEA, but the 1790 Act's twenty-eight-year copyright term can hardly reflect better policy for today's intellectual property markets. Is it really time for Star Wars to fall into the public domain?
118. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 379-81. 119. Nachbar, supra note 114, at 45-46. For instance, the Framers' policy of allowing the widespread piracy of foreign works ignores the modern importance of international copyright protection to American interests. As Graeme Austin explains:
Unless originalist understandings of the scope of copyright law are cognizant of both necessary responses to technological evolution and public international law obligations, much of today's copyright law would be subject to attack on the basis that it departs dramatically from the Framers' conceptions. For the historical claims to work, the United States either needs to return to its pirate ways, or the protection of foreign authors needs to be completely discounted in the analysis. Neither prospect has much appeal. C. Objectivity and Progress
The problems of judicial intervention are magnified when one considers the value judgment inherent in any interpretation of the Progress Phrase. Application of the Progress Phrase involves a nested imponderable: Not only is the net effect on progress of virtually any change in the copyright law imponderable, but the very nature of progress is itself imponderable. Wouldn't it promote progress to deny copyright protection to pornography on the theory that people are distracted by it and waste time that could otherwise be spent reading technical manuals or great literature? Certainly the copyright clause does not demand such differential treatment, 121 but does it prohibit it?
Viewed this way, the Eldred petitioners' argument is not so much that progress is not being served by the CTEA as it is that the right kind of progress is not being served. Eric Eldred and company contended that exclusive rights can only be granted as an incentive to create new works. But why is that necessarily the best way to promote progress? Why not confer more rights to encourage distribution of existing works? Even if the CTEA is a windfall to those who happen to own valuable copyrights, isn't it possible to promote progress by providing that windfall? Consider it a subsidy to those who are good at managing copyrighted works, one that allows them to continue in the endeavor. Whether any of these effects of the CTEA promote progress depends on one's definition of ''progress,'' and that definition, I maintain, is completely contingent.
In the absence of a universally held definition of progress, the seemingly irrational but preference-aggregating nature of legislative decisionmaking seems particularly well suited to the making of copyright policy; judicial review (with its emphasis on history, rationality, and ends-means relationships) appears a correspondingly poor choice, 122 recognition of which was in no small measure behind the Court's decision to turn away from the regime of economic substantive due process that defined the first third of the twentieth century. words, one of ''society's basic principles.'' 124 That reality leaves judges at a decided disadvantage in applying the Progress Phrase. Even if one were indifferent about whether copyright policy be made by the judicial or elected branches of government, demonstrating that judges will make better copyright policy than Congress would be a hard case. But, of course, we do care about whether law is made by judges or legislators; given the political and contingent nature of copyright policy, it is difficult to see how advocates for judicial review of copyright legislation can overcome the counter-majoritarian difficulty's intuitive preference that policymaking take place in the elected branches of government.
IV. JUDGES, COPYRIGHT, AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
The question remains: How should the Court review copyright legislation for consistency with the Copyright Clause? My suggestion is decidedly unoriginal ---I would suggest a more deferential form of ''rational basis'' review than the rational basis review we have come to expect in the Commerce Clause context 125 ---a standard of review that some have called ''minimal rational basis'' or ''conceivable basis. '' 126 This is the standard of review the Court generally employs in cases challenging state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a ''suspect'' class is not involved. 127 It is also the standard of review the Court applies to federal economic regulation challenged under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 128 Indeed, I am describing the standard of review that the Court eventually applied to the federal statute challenged in Carolene Products.
Having already dealt with the Commerce Clause challenge, the Court responded to the defendant's Fifth Amendment rational-basis challenge by explaining that ''by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn into question, must be restricted to the issue of whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.'' 129 Just before the famous footnote of exceptions, the Court made the degree of its deference clear:
Even in the absence of [stated legislative findings and legislative reports], the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. 130 Thus, the conceivable basis test relieves the legislature of any duty to consider particular facts or make stated conclusions; the Court will infer a valid purpose if one could have existed. 131 As the court explained in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., under Fifth Amendment Due Process review, ''a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. '' 132 There is no need for the legislature to have been presented with or considered facts; unsupported ''rational speculation'' is enough. Contrast this with Lopez, in which the Court pointedly highlighted the lack of congressional fact-findings as undercutting the government's claim that the regulation of guns in schools is the regulation of ''[c]ommerce . . . among the several States. '' 133 My proposal has the support not only of history, but also of general applicability, for it is a standard that applies to all of Congress's Article I powers so long as one keeps in mind the various justifications for heightened judicial review. All it takes to distinguish between when to apply rational basis review and when to apply conceivable basis review is [Vol. 2 to remind ourselves of why higher scrutiny is necessary in the cases in which it is applied: When it is possible that a one member of the federal system is extending its power at the cost of others, higher scrutiny is required as a response to the potential for self-serving behavior, but the Court applies the lower conceivable basis standard when it is satisfied that the sovereign in question does indeed have plenary power in the area being regulated. Thus, once the Court in Carolene Products established that the regulation in question was within Congress's plenary interstate commerce power, the Court applied the more deferential Fifth Amendment standard. The same sensitivity to the balance of power applies in the review of state legislation. When a state law is challenged on equal protection grounds (not involving a suspect class), the primacy of the State's police power is not in question, and so the Court applies the more deferential conceivable basis standard. But when a state law has the effect of regulating interstate commerce, an area of federal primacy, the Court subjects the law to a much stricter level of review. Under [dormant] Commerce Clause analysis, the State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the equal protection context, however, if a State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish.
Id. The difference is that, in the dormant Commerce Clause context, the Court itself weighs the balance of the burdens, whereas in the equal protection context, the Court defers to legislative balancing and looks only for some rational relationship between means and ends. R. serve, but it does nothing to determine the level of review the Court should apply when evaluating whether the means serve the end in question. Thus, the Court might balance the harms and benefits as it does in dormant Commerce Clause cases, or it might merely look for some rational relationship between the means and the end. Of course, the Copyright Clause's limitation of the permissible ends of copyright legislation to promoting progress is not much of a limit given the many potential definitions of ''progress.'' See supra text accompanying note 121.
And if Section 301 of the Copyright Act is constitutional, then copyright is one of those areas in which the federal government's power truly is plenary. In the absence of any federalism concerns, there is no reason for the Court to apply standard more restrictive than the conceivable basis test.
In the Progress Phrase context, the test should reflect the dual ambiguity of the phrase itself; the test should be whether a piece of copyright legislation could conceivably further any conceivable definition of ''progress. '' 135 That is a fairly close approximation of the standard of review the Court applied in Eldred. When considering whether the CTEA is ''a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause,'' the Court deferred to Congress's suppositions about the CTEA's effects, saying simply that ''we are not at liberty to secondguess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.''
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The tone of complete deference carried over into the Court's examination of Congress's compliance with the Progress Phrase; the Court reiterated that ''it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives. '' 137 And, although it did not directly consider Congress's ability to define ''progress,'' the Court made it clear that it would enforce no particular definition of ''progress'' on Congress. [Vol. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Textualist approaches to the Copyright Clause that attempt to parse the exact meaning of ''limited Times'' or the Progress Phrase border on the formalistic and ignore both the inherent ambiguity in the Clause's text and the very real possibility that not all constitutional text calls for the same approach to judicial review. Attempts to provide meaning to the Copyright Clause by importing principles purportedly contained in express constitutional prohibitions (such as the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment) also distort the analysis by ignoring the limited application of those prohibitions. Instead, what is needed is a theory of judicial review that recognizes both the peripheral nature of the Copyright Clause ---as it relates to fundamental interests and constitutional structure ---and the political and economic nature of copyright.
The profound insights of the Framers in the field of government ---especially as they touch upon unchanging aspects of human nature, such as the power of self-interest and our natural inclination toward expediency ---make tinkering with the constitutional order a perilous enterprise. But there is no evidence to suggest that the Framers gave copyright more than a second thought. At the same time, the realities of copyright, unlike the forces that drive our choice of government, change constantly, and the dangers of giving in to expediency are no more acute in copyright than in other legislative contexts. The Framers' incomplete and disparate understandings of copyright policy neither deserve nor require the same level of judicial scrutiny as is applied to the portions of the Constitution devoted to protecting fundamental interests and maintaining the structural protections put in place to secure those interests. Instead, we should ask ourselves whether Congress, in exercising the copyright power, could conceivably be serving a conceivable definition of ''progress.'' To ask for more would be to freeze development of the concept of ''progress'' ---an ironic result.
The proper response to the Court's handling of the Copyright Clause in Eldred is a sigh of relief ---relief that the Court did not exercise the kind of judicial exuberance that led to the constitutionalization of data protection in Feist. All that judges can do by holding Congress to a strict reading of the Copyright Clause is to permanently tie us to a version of copyright that reflects neither the nation's political will nor the changing realities of intellectual property. Regardless of how one feels about the policies embodied in the CTEA, heightened constitutional review of copyright legislation is a cure far worse than the disease.
